Skip Navigation


(A copyrighted publication of West Virginia Archives and History)

General R. E. Lee's Northwest Virginia Campaign

By C. H. Ambler

Volume 5, Number 2 (January 1944), pp. 101-115

Admirers and critics alike know little of General R. E. Lee's futile attempt to deal with Federals in northwest Virginia in the summer and autumn of 1861. Because of Lee's later successes and his present pre-eminence among great soldiers of the world, most persons are disposed to regard his experiences in northwest Virginia as minor incidents, such as are found in the lives of most great men. For instance, George Washington had his Fort Necessity.

In brief, General Lee's campaign in northwest Virginia was a failure. According to Matthew Page Andrews, it "opened the way for the Federal government permanently to deprive Virginia of one-third of her territory."1 To George W. Peterkin, a participant and later Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in West Virginia, "the reasons for General Lee's retreat were far from clear."2 General "Jeb" Stuart wrote his wife that Lee had disappointed him as a general,3 and his Pulitzer prize biographer admits that Lee disclosed "a weakness" and that his campaign ended "ingloriously." Moreover, he holds him "blamable" and even "censurable."4 Reflecting the public opinion of eastern Virginia, Richmond newspapers described Lee's plan of campaign at Cheat Mountain as "disappointing" and cathechized him on "mountain warfare."5

Fortunately for the Confederacy and for mankind as well, Jefferson Davis did not lose confidence in General Lee. This was indicated by the decision to send him at once upon his return from northwest Virginia to defend Charleston, South Carolina, and Savannah, Georgia. Significant perhaps of their satisfaction at being rid of Lee, Richmond newspapers said little about this appointment,6 but opposition from other quarters was so strong that President Davis deemed it necessary to advise the governors of South Carolina and Georgia "that Lee, in his opinion, was the best soldier available for the duty assigned him."7 Fortunately, Governor Brown of Georgia, shared this opinion, and Lee was spared to posterity as a great soldier and a great man.

In the light of these facts, it seems that Lee's military experiences in northwest Virginia should be of more general interest. It would seem that the public and military people in particular would be interested to know just what he attempted there and why he failed. Without going too much into detail, it is the purpose of this paper to answer these questions. As an approach thereto a survey of the military situation in northwest Virginia, as of July 28, 1861, the date of Lee's departure from Richmond, will be helpful.

When he set out, Federals in and about Washington were skulking in panic and shame because of their defeat at Manassas one week before, and Federals everywhere were appalled and chagrined because of the disaster which had overtaken them.8 Generally, they expected an attack upon Washington, which, had it been undertaken then, as urged by Stonewall Jackson, might have ended the war in favor of the Confederates.9 Instead of taking advantage of this today obvious opportunity, the conservative President of the Confederacy, who was also commander in chief of its army and navy, turned his attention to northwest Virginia. There, ten days before Manassas, General George B. McClellan had decisively defeated Confederates at Rich Mountain and two days later at Corricks Ford, where their commander, General Robert S. Garnett, was killed.10

In keeping with plans which had been in process of forming for weeks, General McClellan on July 21, date of the Federal defeat at Manassas, announced his intention to carry his military operations into the Kanawha Valley. Thus he hoped to complete his conquest of northwest Virginia and establish the authority of the Reorganized Government set up at Wheeling one month before.11 This was preparatory to his chief objective, an attack by way of the Kanawha Valley upon the railroads centering at Staunton.12 As a part of this plan General Jacob D. Cox was already pushing General Henry A. Wise out of the Kanawha Valley.13

These plans were altered somewhat, when McClellan was on July 22 summoned to command the Army of the Potomac and save panic-stricken Federals in and about Washington.14 His command in the northwest was then turned over to General William S. Rosecrans who, as a former mining prospector in the Kanawha Valley, was familiar with the geography of that region.15 Brigadier General Joseph J. Reynolds was placed in direct command of the Federal force in Tygart Valley, and he fortified Cheat Mountain so as to command the western approach to Staunton. Meanwhile Rosecrans, in keeping with a plan previously worked out by McClellan prepared to reinforce General Cox who on July 29 took Gauley Bridge.16 To the north the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad west of Cumberland, Maryland, was in control of Federals.17

The situation resolved itself to this: All Virginia west of Cheat Mountain, except New River Valley and the region to the south of Kanawha River, was in almost complete control of Federals. They were thus able to complete the Reorganized Government of Virginia, which in turn sponsored the dismemberment of that state and the formation and admission of West Virginia to separate statehood, but the outcome of the wager of battle remained undetermined. There were those, among them Stonewall Jackson,18 who thought that the Confederates should push into the extreme northwest in sufficient numbers to hold it by force, but for evident reasons that would have been a difficult undertaking. Most Confederate leaders were therefore generally agreed that their stand should be on the principal ridge of the Alleghenies and that Staunton, a strategic railroad and agricultural center, should be defended at all hazards. This was the task assigned Lee.19

In view of the fact that the Federals had not yet reached the principal ridge of the Alleghenies, except in the region of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the military situation in the northwest was therefore not hopeless for the Confederates, and prominent Federals were predicting their own defeat.20 The poetry and art loving but efficient General Henry R. Jackson of Georgia, with about 4,000 Confederates, was stationed at Monterey,21 and the Mexican War tried veteran, General William W. Loring, was rallying the remnants of Garnett's shattered army and drilling recruits into soldiers.22 It seemed possible therefore to make a stand atop the Alleghenies and use them as a base of operations, from which to drive the Federals from Cheat Mountain and Tygart Valley.23

By withdrawing his forces to and beyond Lewisburg. General Wise had meanwhile escaped a possible flanking movement from the north by way of the Gauley and Greenbrier valleys and was in position to defend the strategically important Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.24 Meantime, General John B. Floyd who had been organizing an army in southwest Virginia, was ordered to combine his force with that of Wise and, in case his flank could be protected, to retract Wise's steps along the James River and Kanawha Turnpike all the way to Gauley Bridge and, if possible, beyond.25

In view of this situation Lee's apparent detachment of mind, as he moved to his new assignment, may not have been as cultivated as is claimed.26 Indicative of a feeling of security, his sole military attendants were his friends, Lieutenant Colonels John A. Washington and Walter H. Taylor, and two private attendants, both Negroes. Thus accompanied, his heart went out in gratitude to "Almighty God" for the "glorious world He has given us," as recorded in the beautiful valleys and majestic mountains which greeted him between Staunton and Monterey.27

Lee's contacts, first made at Staunton, with the backwash of Garnett's army of dirty, bedraggled, and demoralized men, were somewhat disillusioning.28 To a less capable and optimistic leader they might have been ominous. The impressions thus produced on Lee were doubtless neutralized somewhat by an unexpressed yet strong confidence in his ability to deal with the situation. While not boasting of his achievements, as had McClellan, General Lee and President Davis knew that it was Lee who was mainly responsible for the defeat of the Federals at Manassas. More than any other person, he had trained the Confederate man power for that contest and determined the point of its concentration and the location of the famous "Beauregard Line."29

There was also something of a challenge in Lee's new assignment, as the outcome, plus Manassas, might prove determining. Then, too, he was attempting to undo the much lauded accomplishments of the boastful McClellan whose metal was, however, worthy the steel of any true soldier.30 Adding jest to the contest was the fact that McClellan was then actively engaged in trying to undo the results of Manassas. Thus the situation resolved itself to a somewhat personal contest.

We shall now see what Lee did about it. With Confederates and Federals watching each other from their respective outposts on Allegheny and Cheat mountains over a beautiful expanse of woodland and stream only fifteen miles wide, Lee resolved to dislodge the enemy from his entrenched position. This accomplished, he would then be in position to push him out of Tygart Valley and destroy the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at Grafton and other strategic points. With his flank thus protected General Floyd would be in position to move against the Federals at Gauley Bridge. If successful, he planned to push them out of the Kanawha Valley and pursue them into Ohio. This accomplished, he could join forces with General Loring and complete the conquest of northwest Virginia.31

Capable officer that he was, Lee did not propose to move directly against the Federals on Cheat Mountain. Fortunately for his purposes, a difficult but usable road, not occupied by Federals, connected Millboro on the Virginia Central Railroad with Valley Mountain which overlooked the Federal camp at Elkwater on Tygart River and was also in striking distance of their camp on Cheat Mountain.32 General Jackson had seen the importance of this road. Before Lee came up Loring had on July 30 established his headquarters on it at Huntersville, near present Marlinton,33 and Colonel William Gilham had taken possession of Valley Mountain.34

As these moves were in keeping with instructions issued by General Lee before he left Richmond 35 and as their execution had been as complete as possible under the circumstances, the results were doubtless gratifying to him. Except for the untrained condition of his troops and the inclemency of the weather, conditions were therefore much to his liking, when he, unannounced, on August 3, rode into Loring's headquarters.36

Lee's difficulties at this time were not primarily those which one would expect to encounter in a mountainous country occupied by a superior and entrenched enemy. They were rather those human equations which from time to time in world history have wrought the undoing of soldiers, statesmen, and others. Shortly following the death of General Garnett at Corricks Ford, Lee had sent General Loring with discretionary orders to deal with the situation in northwest Virginia. As Loring reached Huntersville only four days before Lee arrived and had not yet made his plans, it was doubtless natural for him to resent Lee's presence which he interpreted as an effort to tell him what to do and how to do it.37 At this point it is recalled that Loring was a general in the Mexican War and Lee was only a captain.

More tactful and less emotional than Loring, Lee had been sent out by President Davis for no other purpose than to inspect and consult "on the plan of campaign."38 Accordingly he chose to play the part of a diplomat rather than that of a commanding officer. All military orders were therefore issued in the name of "Brigadier General W. W. Loring," and "at a time when everything depended on speed," Loring was allowed to take time out to establish a base at Huntersville on the road between Millboro and Valley Mountain. Or, as is well said by Dr. Freeman, "the great opportunity was being lost for fear the soldiers might miss their breakfast!"39 As a consequence Loring did not move his entire command to Valley Mountain until August 12,40 but it was then too late to surprise General Reynolds at Elkwater. Moreover, the torrential rains made roads all but impassable, and measle were taking heavy tolls in the Confederate camps.41

Under the circumstances there was left to Lee one of two alternatives: He might either return to Millboro on the railroad and end the campaign, or he might try to dislodge the Federals from Cheat Mountain. As the latter alternative permitted concerted action on the part of General Jackson, stationed on Allegheny Mountain, and General Loring, it was adopted. The opposing forces each totaled about 15,000, and, although half of Lee's men were sick,42 he planned to follow up a possible success at Cheat Mountain by an attack upon the Federals at Elkwater. If successful in this campaign, he would then have been in position to complete the conquest of northwest Virginia.

Every detail in the Confederate plans for attainment of these objects received Lee's personal attention.43 His elevation on August 31 to be a full general in the regular Army of the Confederacy, outranked only by Samuel Cooper and Albert Sidney Johnston, was helpful. The promotion tended to allay General Loring's jealousy and to permit Lee gradually to take over the strategy of operations.44

It was about this time that he discovered a sort of rabbit path over which a courageous column could make its way from Valley Mountain to a point on the Staunton-Parkersburg Turnpike about two miles west of the enemy force on Cheat Mountain. About the same time he learned of an overlooking summit to the south of that mountain, from which it might be successfully attacked. He planned therefore to have each of these strategic points seized early in the morning of September 12. At the same time a column was to advance along the mountainside on the right bank of Tygart River and cut off a possible Federal retreat from Elkwater; General Jackson was to advance toward the enemy force on Cheat Mountain; and Lee and Loring were to move down Tygart River toward Elkwater.45

The respective columns having placed themselves in striking positions, the signal for these movements was to be the sound of artillery fire from the summit overlooking the Federal camp on Cheat Mountain.46 At his own request the execution of this phase of the plan was entrusted to Colonel Albert Rust of the Third Arkansas Regiment, but he was intimidated into inaction by captured Federal pickets who succeeded in convincing him that he was overwhelmingly outnumbered and that attack would be suicidal. Thus the expected and awaited signal was not given and Lee's first battle ended in "utter fiasco." Worse still, the morale of his army was gone.47

As Lee had remained "sanguine of taking the enemy's works" until the very last, his failure was a great disappointment to him, but in characteristic manner he made the best of it. To that end he determined to hold his position in Tygart Valley and on Valley Mountain as bases from which to strike the enemy at Elkwater from the rear. A brigade was accordingly set to cutting a road in the direction of Rich Mountain and a reconnoitering party, including Colonel Washington and Rooney Lee, was sent to explore the left bank of the Tygart River in the direction of the Federal camp. This movement resulted in the death of Colonel Washington and added only grief to Lee's disappointment.48 "With absolutely no positive results for all his planning," he then ordered his force back to Valley Mountain. An indignant Tennesseean expressed the resulting sentiments in these words: "Never were men more sick of Virginia and Virginians than we were."49

Characteristically, Lee closed this phase of the campaign with the statement, "We must try again." His chief comfort was doubtless in the obvious inability of the enemy to advance. Therefore, having detached enough of his force to guard the passes leading into Greenbrier Valley and to Staunton, he on September 20 directed his course toward General Floyd's camp at Meadow Bluff on the James River and Kanawha Turnpike about fifteen miles west of Lewisburg and sixty miles south of Valley Mountain. As General Rosecrans had ten days before engaged General Floyd in an indecisive action at Carnifex Ferry, Rosecrans was in position to pursue Floyd and reinforce Cox at Gauley Bridge.50 Lee accordingly ordered Loring to follow him with most of his force.51 The campaign was thus shifted to another sector.

The following day Lee, accompanied only by Colonel Taylor and a small cavalry escort, rode into Floyd's camp, there to take up at close range the threads of a controversy between Floyd and Wise, which had already consumed too much of Lee's time and was then demoralizing Confederate forces. Ever since Floyd had taken over on August 6 he and Wise, former governors of Virginia and political rivals of long standing, had engaged in an unseemly controversy regarding their respective prerogatives, the proper tactics to pursue, and the strength and movements of the enemy.52

Among other things, Floyd, against Lee's advice and over Wise's protest, had fought a battle at Carnifex Ferry. When forced to retreat, he blamed Wise for the outcome.53 When Lee joined them, they were about twelve miles apart engaged in a battle of words about the strategic merits of their respective positions at Sewell Mountain and Meadow Bluff. Fortunately for Lee, this empasse came to an end on September 25, when Wise received an order from Secretary of War Benjamin directing him to report in person and "with the least delay" to the adjutant General in Richmond.54

As Wise and Floyd had refused to cooperate by joining their forces, each urging that he was about to be attacked and that the proposed troop movement would, under the circumstances, be suicidal, General Lee set out at once to investigate. After a careful study of the situation he was convinced that Floyd was in no immediate danger 55 and that a Federal attack, if attempted, would be by way of the James River and Kanawha Turnpike from Gauley Bridge. Accordingly, he decided to maintain Wise's position on big Sewell Mountain and withdrew a part of Floyd's force to that point. At the same time he indicated to Floyd his desire that he should follow him.56 His failure to do so was neutralized by the timely arrival on September 29 of General Loring with 9,000 men. This enabled Lee to use Floyd's force of about 2,000 to facilitate the transport of supplies and to serve as a necessary reserve. This arrangement also saved Floyd's face, as he had staked his reputation upon the necessity of holding Meadow Bluff.57

The Federals had meanwhile approached the Confederate position on Sewell Mountain, and it thus became necessary for Lee to determine whether to attack them or await their attack.58 As he held a strong natural position and the necessary reserve of supplies to sustain an offensive could not be accumulated, he resolved to await the expected attack. Thus the first days of October slipped by until the night of the 5-6, when pickets reported the Federals in motion. For a time the Confederates were breathless with suspense, but no enemy came. It was not until daylight that Lee discovered the cause of their concern. Instead of moving to attack, Rosecrans had moved in the other direction.59

Unwilling to be outgeneraled in this matter and not averse to giving the boastful Floyd an opportunity to sweep the Federals out of the Kanawha Valley and invade Ohio, Lee decided to pursue the enemy. For this purpose Floyd was sent with about 4,000 men to the south side of New River with orders to move against the Federals and cut their communications at Gauley Bridge.60 This accomplished, Lee and Loring were to press forward to that point and help drive them out of the region about the Hawk's Nest. Successful in this, they might then drive them out of the Kanawha Valley.61

In pursuit of this policy Floyd on October 23 seized Cotton Hill, a high elevation overlooking the Federal camp at Gauley Bridge, and at once began to harass it by direct cannon fire.62 This continued for about three weeks, at the end of which he was outflanked by Brigadier General Henry W. Benham and forced to retire.63 In doing so he, in a characteristic manner, placed the blame upon Lee.64 Soon thereafter he was transferred to the army of General Albert Sidney Johnston, and, at the time of the disaster of February 15, 1862, he was in immediate command at Fort Donelson.

Meanwhile Lee had given up pursuit of Rosecrans and, for reasons to be stated shortly, left Floyd to his own resources. The Federal attack at Greenbrier River, October 3, was a contributing factor.65 Although they had been repulsed, Lee believed that the Federals would persist in their purpose to gain control of the railroads in and around Staunton. Accordingly, he had on October 20 ordered General Loring to place his entire force in position to protect them.66 In this Lee anticipated General Robert H. Milroy's unsuccessful attack of December 13 on Allegheny Mountain and thus saved Staunton and its railroads. Ten days later, October 30, Lee "turned his horse's head eastward to the Virginia Central Railroad and left western Virginia -- left it to the enemy." Thus his "Kanawha and New River Campaign" ended as "ingloriously" as had his efforts about Cheat Mountain.67

In light of the outstanding incidents of these failures, their causes need not occupy us long. Loring's delay, Rust's mistake, and Wise's and Floyd's foolish quarreling were indeed despicable. Except in the case of the gullible Rust, they were not, however, necessarily fatal. The human factors may therefore be reduced to minor roles.

Fortunately perhaps, the chief blame can be placed on the inclement weather, for the three months spent by General Lee in the Virginia Alleghenies in 1861 were unprecedented on that score. It rained almost constantly and the nights were cold and dismal. As a result there was frost at intervals during the entire period; streams were swollen; roads were impassable; and measles decimated the Confederate ranks. Among accompanying phenomena, ice formed on Valley Mountain on the night of August 14-15, and on the eve of the expected battle between Rosecrans and Lee on Sewell Mountain, New and Kanawha rivers reached the highest stages in their history.68 On this point Lee's biographer, Freeman, concludes, "It is very doubtful whether any soldier could have succeeded in such weather," especially when, as stated by the same author, "The rains appear to have washed away his initiative."69

The next most effective single factor in Lee's failures was perhaps his inability to get supplies because of the inclement weather and inadequate transportation. As a consequence offensive operations were restricted to brief periods, and men and animals alike became gaunt and jaded. More than anything else Lee's inability to get supplies determined his plans on Sewell Mountain and his subsequent decision not to continue the pursuit of Rosecrans. Of his failure to engage him at that time and to support Floyd at Gauley Bridge, he later told a friend that "a battle would have been without substantial result, that the Confederates were seventy miles from their rail base, that the roads were almost impassable, that it would have been difficult to procure two days' food, and that if he had attacked and beaten Rosecrans, he would have been compelled to retire because he could not provision his army."70

Among the more human factors responsible for Lee's failure account must be taken of his "excessive consideration for the feelings of others."71 A product of the slaveholding aristocracy, he had not yet learned to command his peers or even his subordinates. Like most Virginians of the period, he was also too deferential to politicians. On this point, it should be recalled that "the politicians were so powerful," and that "Lee had been sent out to harmonize differences, not to aggravate them." To put it another way, he was only the agent of President Davis who, as commander in chief, maintained direct contact with his field officers and directed their movements.72 But had Lee been vested with more complete authority, the outcome would not perhaps have been different.

Why then was General Lee retained and how did he become a great soldier? The answer is brief and simple: Great as he became as a soldier, he was even greater as a man. In his negative accomplishments in present West Virginia, his manly qualities were abundantly attested. Among other things, his "code of honor did not countenance self-vindication at the expense of others."73 He therefore refused to make a formal report of what happened there and left his own vindication to time and the historian, if indeed he even thought about such a thing, so completely was he lost in the cause of liberty. As with most great men, it was a case of losing one's self for a cause and thus unconsciously creating an undying entity in the lives of his people and through them in the memory and esteem of good men and women everywhere.

That is why we in West Virginia, daughter of the state Lee loved and whose dismemberment he deplored, can, do, and will continue to venerate the name of Robert E. Lee. That is why the places where he camped and the observation posts, from which he watched enemy movements, tend to be sacred soil in the Mountain State. That is why West Virginians, unable to claim Lee as their own, as they do Stonewall Jackson, take pride in claiming "Traveller," that faithful steed which Lee purchased while on his ill-fated campaign and which in his many fine qualities reflected the character of his master.

1. Virginia The Old Dominion, p. 491.

2. William E. Brooks, Lee the Virginian, p. 140.

3. John W. Thomason, Jeb Stuart, p. 131.

4. Douglas S. Freeman, R. E. Lee, Vol. I, pp. 574-576.

5. The Richmond Dispatch, September 26, 1861; Brooks, Lee, pp. 140-143.

6. Freeman, Lee, Vol. I, p. 607.

7. Ibid.

8. James F. Rhodes, History of the Civil War, p. 43.

9. McClellan's Own Story, pp. 66-67; G. F. R. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson, pp. 154-156.

10. Official Records, I, Vol. II, pp. 194-285; Freeman, Lee, Vol. I, pp. 532-534.

11. Pierpont, Letters and Papers (W. Va. University Library).

12. Jacob D. Cox, "McClellan in West Virginia," in Battles and Leaders, Vol. I, pp. 127-130; Official Records, I, Vol. II, pp. 50, 743-744, 752.

13. Jacob D. Cox, Military Reminiscences, Vol. I, pp. 59-80; Official Records, I, Vol. II, pp. 197, 200.

14. Official Records, I, Vol. V, pp. 749, 753.

15. Official Records, I, Vol. V, pp. 753, 759.

16. Cox, "McClellan in West Virginia," in Battles and Leaders, Vol. I, pp. 143-144; Cox, Reminiscences, Vol. I, pp. 81-84; Official Records, I, Vol. II, p. 759; ibid., Vol. V, pp. 552, 564.

17. F. P. Summers, The Baltimore and Ohio in the Civil War, pp. 88-89.

18. Official Records, I, Vol. II, p. 863; Henderson, Jackson, Vol. I, pp. 164, 174-181, 185.

19. Freeman, Lee, Vol. 1, pp. 545, 552.

20. Official Records, I, Vol. V, pp. 552, 561-562, 564.

21. Official Records, I, Vol. II, p. 986; Freeman, Lee, Vol. 1, pp. 543-544.

22. Ibid., p. 550.

23. Official Records, I, Vol. II, p. 986.

24. Official Records, I, Vol. II, pp. 290-292, 1011; Ibid., Vol. V, pp. 150-165, 768-770; Freeman, Lee, Vol. I, pp. 579-580.

25. Official Records, I, Vol. V, pp. 781. See also ibid., I, Vol. V, pp. 775, 780, 786, 788-794, 802-807, 819, 822, 829, 831, 836-838, 859-862; ibid., Vol. II, pp. 190-226.

26. Freeman, Lee, Vol. I, p. 543.

27. Ibid.

28. Official Records, I, Vol. II, pp. 989, 998; Freeman, Lee, Vol. I, p. 544.

29. Official Records, I, Vol. II, pp. 504-505; Freeman, Lee, Vol. I, pp. 539-540.

30. According to General Jacob D. Cox, McClellan, following his success at Rich Mountain, was dubbed "the young Napoleon" and "photographers got him to stand with folded arms, in the historic pose." Battles and Leaders, Vol. I, p. 135.

31. Official Records, I, Vol. LI, p. 190 ff; ibid., Vol. II, p. 996.

32. Official Records, I, Vol. XIX, pt. 1, p. 947.

33. Official Records, I, Vol. II, pp. 999, 1006, 1009.

34. Ibid., p. 1006.

35. Ibid., p. 996.

36. Freeman, Lee, Vol. I, p. 549.

37. Ibid., p. 550; Aronistead L. Long; Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, p. 120.

38. Richmond Examiner, July 31, 1861; Freeman, Lee, Vol. I, p. 542.

39. Ibid., p. 551.

40. Official Records, I, Vol. V, pp. 555-556; Freeman, Lee, Vol. I, p. 556.

41. Ibid., pp. 557-559.

42. Official Records, I, Vol. LI, pt. 2, pp. 282-284.

43. Ibid.; Freeman, Lee, Vol. I, pp. 560-568.

44. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 559-560.

45. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 560-563.

46. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 566-567.

47. Lee made no official report on his campaign about Cheat Mountain. Freeman, Lee, Vol. I, p. 568.

48. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 569-570.

49. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 571.

50. Official Records, I, Vol. V, pp. 128-165.

51. Freeman, Lee, Vol. I, p. 574.

52. Floyd addressed most of his letters to President Davis, whereas Wise wrote vitriolic letters to Floyd and explained them to Lee. Their correspondence can be found in Official Records, I, Vol. V, p. 776 ff.

53. Ibid., I, Vol. V, pp. 147, 900.

54. Ibid., I, Vol. V, pp. 148-149.

55. Ibid., I, Vol. LI, pt. 2, p. 312; Freeman, Lee, Vol. I, p. 591.

56. Ibid.

57. Official Records, I, Vol. LI, pt. 2, p. 324; Freeman, Lee, Vol. I, pp. 592, 595.

58. Ibid., p. 596.

59. Official Records, I, Vol. V, p. 615.

60. Official Records, I, Vol. LI, pt. 2, pp. 335, 337.

61. Ibid.

62. Official Records, I, Vol. V, pp. 917, 924, 927.

63. Ibid., I, Vol. V, pp. 255, 278, 286.

64. Ibid., I, Vol. V, p. 286.

65. Ibid., I, Vol. V, pp. 220-221.

66. Ibid., I, Vol. V, p. 908.

67. Freeman, Lee, Vol. I, p. 602.

68. Ibid., pp. 557-558, 573, 601.

69. Ibid., pp. 574, 601.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 577.

72. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 542, 592.

73. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 603.


West Virginia History Journal: Table of Contents

West Virginia History Center West Virginia History Center

West Virginia Archives and History